Abstract. Consider a many-to-many matching market that involves two finite disjoint sets, a set of applicants A and a set of courses C. Each applicant has preferences on the different sets of courses she can attend, while each course has a quota of applicants that it can admit. In this paper, we examine Pareto optimal matchings (briefly POM) in the context of such markets, that can also incorporate additional constraints, e.g., each course bearing some cost and each applicant having an available budget. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a many-to-many matching to be Pareto optimal and show that checking whether a given matching is Pareto optimal requires O(|A| 2 · |C| 2 ) time. Moreover, we provide a generalized version of serial dictatorship, which can be used to obtain any many-to-many POM. We also study the problems of finding a minimum cardinality and a maximum cardinality POM. We show that the former is NP-complete even in one-to-one markets with the preference list of each applicant containing at most two entries. For the latter problem we show that, although it is polynomially solvable in the special one-to-one case, it is NP-complete for many-to-many markets.
Introduction
A university runs a leisure centre that offers a variety of activities, e.g., sports, language courses, etc. (we shall call all of them courses), to students and employees (we shall call all of them applicants). Each applicant can attend one or more courses and, because of various technical constraints, each course can only accept a restricted number of applicants. Furthermore, certain additional rules may apply. For example, each applicant, if accepted, may have to pay some fee as a contribution to cover the running costs of the course. On the other hand, each applicant may have a budget that she is able to allocate to these courses that she cannot exceed (hereafter, we refer to applicants as females). Two simple problems that naturally arise in this many-to-many matching context are those of assigning each applicant to all the courses she desires and of assigning each applicant to at least one course. Both cases reduce to well-known combinatorial optimization problems, namely the maximum flow problem and the maximum cardinality bipartite matching problem respectively, see e.g. [6] .
In real life however, it is usually the case that the applicants do not desire equally all the courses they apply for; rather they have certain preferences over them. The problem that arises when taking these preferences into account will be called the Course Allocation problem (cap). In the cap setting, various optimization criteria for the obtained assignments can be formulated. Here, we shall concentrate on Pareto optimality.
Pareto optimality, sometimes called Pareto efficiency, is a well established notion in economic science. It is the primary welfare goal in many real matching markets, especially educational markets assigning pupils to schools (see [3, 4] for assigning students to public schools in several US school districts, [7] for college admission in Turkey) or students to campus housing [8] , [10] . A detailed account of recent developments regarding Pareto optimality in the context of matching problems under preferences has appeared in [9] .
The special case of one-to-one cap is often called the House Allocation problem, as it arises in the context of assigning tenants to houses [1] , [2] . A detailed study of computational aspects of the House Allocation problem was provided in [5] . The authors gave necessary and sufficient conditions for a matching to be Pareto optimal and showed that these conditions can be checked in polynomial time. They also established that any Pareto optimal matching (POM) can be obtained by the well-known serial dictatorship mechanism [1] and proposed an efficient algorithm to find a POM of maximum cardinality. Analogous results have been established in [13] for the many-to-one (capacitated ) House Allocation problem, i.e., the variant where each house can accommodate more than one tenant.
Regarding intractability results, it has been established that finding a Pareto optimal one-to-one matching of minimum cardinality is NP-complete even in the one-to-one case [5] . A related recent paper [12] deals with the computational complexity of serial dictatorship. The authors prove that in this mechanism, the problem of deciding whether there exists an order of proposals such that a given agent receives a given object is NP-complete, while the problem asking whether in each order of proposals a given agent receives a given object can be decided in polynomial time.
In this paper, we completely characterize Pareto optimal matchings in the many-to-many setting and show that deciding whether a given matching is Pareto optimal requires polynomial time. Consequently, our work concludes the research of [5, 13] on these issues for two-sided markets as it treats the general case. We also generalize the serial dictatorship mechanism, thus providing a procedure that can be used to obtain any many-to-many POM. This result is important also because, unlike in the one-to-one case, serial dictatorship alone cannot guarantee that all Pareto optimal matchings will be generated [5] . Further, we show that finding a minimum cardinality POM is NP-complete, even when considering the simplified one-to-one case with the preference list of each applicant containing at most two entries, thus strengthening the result given in [5] . Moreover, we prove that the maximum cardinality POM problem is also NP-complete, although it is polynomially solvable in the (capacitated) House Allocation case [5] , [9] , [13] .
Definitions
An instance of the Course Allocation problem involves a set A of n applicants and a set C of m courses. Each course c ∈ C has a quota q(c). A subset A ⊆ A of applicants is feasible for a course c if |A | ≤ q(c). Each applicant a has a preference list P (a), a strictly ordered list of a subset of courses. These courses are acceptable for a and we shall write c a c if applicant a prefers course c to course c . Moreover, there is a family F a of subsets of courses associated with each applicant a. We say that the sets of courses belonging to F a are feasible for a, while all other sets are infeasible. For each applicant a, we suppose that F a is downward closed, i.e. if C ⊆ C and C ∈ F a , then C ∈ F a too. Note that the House Allocation problem is obtained if q(c) = 1 for each c ∈ C and all the feasible sets are just singletons, containing the acceptable courses for each applicant.
As discussed in the Introduction, additional rules may apply in this setting. Consider, for instance, the case in which each course has an attendance cost and each applicant may have a budget. The corresponding framework can be obtained as follows. Suppose that each course c has a nonnegative price p(c) and each applicant a has a budget b(a). Let p(C ) denote the total price of all courses in the subset C , i.e. p(C ) = c∈C p(c).
It is easy to see that F a defined in this way is indeed downward closed. In this paper, we shall call this special case the price-budget cap.
Other more complicated situations also fit in our model. For example, besides the price, each course might also have some time requirements and applicants might be restricted not only in the available budget, but also in time they are able to allocate to the courses. In another case, courses may be of different types (sports, languages, music, etc) and the applicants may wish to take at most one courses of each type. Any such case can be handled by appropriately defining F a , i.e., the feasible set of courses of any applicant a, as long as F a remains downward closed.
An assignment M is a subset of A × C. The set of applicants assigned to a course c will be denoted by M (c) = {a ∈ A; (a, c) ∈ M } and similarly, the set of courses assigned to an applicant a is M (a) = {c ∈ C; (a, c) ∈ M }. An assignment M is a matching if M (a) is feasible for each applicant a and M (c) is feasible for each course c ∈ C. An applicant a ∈ A is assigned if M (a) = ∅, otherwise she is unassigned. A course c ∈ C is open if M (c) = ∅, otherwise it is closed. An applicant a and a course c are undersubscribed if M (a) is not an inclusionwise maximal element of F a and |M (c)| < q(c), respectively. If |M (c)| = q(c), we say that c is full.
Applicant a prefers matching M to matching M if she prefers M (a) to M (a). We suppose that applicants compare the sets of courses lexicographically. This means that applicant a orders the acceptable courses according to her preference list from the most preferred to the least preferred one and compares the characteristic vectors χ a of feasible sets with the entries arranged in this order. More precisely, if C and C are two feasible sets of courses, then
, that is, the most preferred element of symmetric difference
Notice that the ordering of sets of courses generated by a strict preference order P (a) is also strict. The feasible sets of applicant a 1 in the order of her preference are
for applicants a 2 and a 3 , their orderings are
Notice that this ordering is compatible with the assumption of the following greedy behaviour of applicants: if an applicant can freely pick her favourite assignment from some set of available courses, then she goes down her preference list and adds the next course if and only if the set of courses comprised of those chosen so far plus the new course is still feasible.
We say that a matching M dominates a matching M (M M ) if at least one applicant prefers M to M and no applicant prefers M to M .
Proposition 1 The relation ' ' forms a partial order over the set of matchings.
A Pareto optimal matching is a matching that is not dominated by any other matching. Thanks to Proposition 1 and finiteness of the set of all matchings, a Pareto optimal matching exists for each instance of cap.
Abraham et al. [5] characterized Pareto optimal one-to-one matchings as those that are maximal, trade-in-free and coalition-free. We generalize their result below.
Let M be any matching and c ∈ P (a)\M (a). Let us denote D M (a, c) = {c ∈ M (a); c a c }. Intuitively, D M (a, c) is the set of courses applicant a is happy to drop from her current assignment M (a) in exchange for getting course c, as, according to the lexicographic ordering, agent a prefers the set (M (a)\D M (a, c))∪ {c} to M (a).
Let us say that a sequence of applicant-course pairs
is a coalition with respect to a matching M if for i = 0, 1, . . . , r − 1 we have (here and later, when dealing with coalitions, we always understand the indices modulo r):
The matching
is said to be obtained from M by satisfying coalition K.
Definition 1 Let M be a matching. We say that M is (i) maximal, if there exists no applicant a ∈ A and course c / ∈ M (a) such that
(ii) trade-in-free, if there exists no applicant a ∈ A and course c / ∈ M (a) such that
(iii) coalition-free, if there exists no coalition with respect to M .
Example 2 Consider again the price-budget cap instance given in Table 1 and a matching
As all the courses are full, M 1 is maximal as well as trade-in-free. However, it is not coalition-free, as it admits two coalitions, namely
is not trade-in-free, as applicant a 3 will be happy to drop course c 1 and get course c 3 while this course has a free quota. The obtained matching
is not maximal, as the pair (a 2 , c 1 ) can be added and we finally arrive at a POM
Theorem 1 A matching in an instance of cap is Pareto optimal if and only if it is maximal, trade-in-free and coalition-free.
Proof. It is easy to see that if M is a POM, then it is maximal, trade-in-free and coalition-free.
To show the opposite direction, assume that a matching M is not Pareto optimal but it is maximal, trade-in-free and coalition-free. Since M is not Pareto optimal, there is some matching M and an applicant a 0 such that
M being trade-in-free implies that
. In this case, both (a2) and (b2) must hold. The assumption that the families of feasible sets are downward closed implies that (b2) is stronger, so it must be that (
We can now proceed as above with a 1 in the role of a 0 thus either yielding a contradiction (Case 1) or eventually revealing a coalition (since the applicants' set is finite) (Case 2), which in turn contradicts our assumption that M is coalitionfree.
Testing Pareto optimality of a given matching can be performed by testing each of the three properties separately. However, we construct a special digraph, called the extended envy graph, that enables testing all the three conditions simultaneously. (Compare [5] , where a simpler envy graph was used only to test the existence of coalitions.) Moreover, this digraph will be helpful in a generalization of serial dictatorship.
For convenience, let us define, for a matching M , an applicant a and courses c ∈ P (a)\M (a) and c ∈ M (a):
to be the set of courses assigned to a if she acquires course c and drops from M (a) course c and all the courses she prefers less than c.
Definition 2 The extended envy graph
That is, G(M ) has one vertex per applicant, one per course and one per pair in M (matching vertices). The arc set E G(M ) has three types of arcs, namely the availability arcs E 1 G(M ) that indicate that a course c is available but not matched to applicant a; the matching arcs E 2 G(M ) that form vertex-disjoint paths, each containing |M (a)| + 1 vertices in increasing order with respect to P (a) (in this context, vertex a corresponds to applicant a being unassigned); and the envy arcs E 3 G(M ) that establish that applicant a envies some course not contained in M (a). Envy arcs are, in turn, of three types, namely arcs (a, c) showing that a wishes and can (in terms of feasibility) to add c to her courses; arcs (ac, c ) indicating that a wishes and can trade-in c ; and arcs (ac, a c ) indicating that a wishes and can acquire c matched to some other applicant a by dropping from M (a) the courses that are not better than c. Notice that, under the reasonable assumption that any course is acceptable and individually feasible by some applicant, c ∈ V G(M ) has no incident arcs if and only if |M (c)| = q(c).
Extended envy graphs for matchings from Example 2 are given in Figure 1 .
Theorem 2 M is a POM if and only if G(M ) is acyclic.
Proof. If M is not a POM, Theorem 1 yields that M is not maximal or not tradein-free or not coalition-free. If M is not maximal, Definition 2 implies that
for some a ∈ A and c ∈ C, hence a cycle. If M is not trade-in-free, again Definition 2 yields that there is an applicant a and courses c, c such that c a c and G(M ) contains arc (c , a) ∈ E 1 G(M ) , a path from a to ac, arcs in E 2 G(M ) and the arc (ac, c ) ∈ E 3 G(M ) , hence a cycle. If there is a coalition K = ((a 0 , c 0 ) , . . . , (a r−1 , c r−1 )) in M, Definition 2 implies that arcs
To prove the converse, assume that G(M ) contains a cycle C. Case 1. C contains an availability arc (c,
too. So this case reduces to Case 1a. ) contains no arc of the form (a , c). Then the only incoming arc to vertex c can be an envy arc from some vertex a c such that F M (a , c , c) ∈ F a (also notice that, in that case, (c, a ) ∈ E 1 G(M ) ). Thus applicant a would trade-in c, i.e., M is not trade-in-free. Case 2. C contains no availability arc. Then it contains no vertices in A ∪ C. Hence, Definition 2 yields that C can only be a sequence of sub-paths, each containing some (possibly an empty set of) matching arcs plus a single envy arc of type 3. Formally, C comprises sub-paths P i , i ∈ {0, . . . , r−1}, where each P i starts at vertex a i c i , then proceeds using only matching arcs to vertex a i c i and ends with an envy arc (a i c i , a i+1 c i+1 ) ; where by definition c i+1 a i c i (recall that indices are taken modulo r, hence a i+1 = a 0 for i = r − 1). If applicants a i are pairwise different, observe that ((a 0 , c 0 ), (a 1 , c 1 ) , . . . , (a r−1 , c r−1 )) is a coalition. Otherwise, there exists j = i such that a i = a j . Let us denote a i = a j by a and suppose w.l.o.g. that c j a c i . As the indices on C are taken modulo r, we can suppose i < j. Then we replace the part of C between the vertices a i c i and a j c j simply by the path consisting of the matching arcs leading from a i c i to a j c j (remember that a i and a j are both equal to a and c j a c j a c i , so this path exists). If necessary, a similar shortcut can be applied several times, eventually obtaining a cycle with all applicants mutually different, hence giving a coalition.
Figure 1: Extended envy graphs for matchings
M 1 , M 2 , M 3 , M 4 of Example 2 Case 1c. E 3 G(M
Corollary 1 Checking Pareto optimality of a matching can be performed in O(|A|
Proof. Follows from Theorem 2 and the fact that a cycle can be found in Let us remark here that the generalized envy graph could also be used for finding a POM. Simply start by any matching M , construct G(M ) and if G(M ) is not acyclic, improve it according to any existing cycle. For the new matching construct again its generalized envy graph etc., until an acyclic graph is obtained. It is easy to see that this procedure will eventually lead to a POM, but it is difficult to derive a bound on the number of matchings constructed. In the next section, we propose a much faster approach.
Pareto optimality and serial dictatorship
Recall that serial dictatorship (henceforth abbreviated by SD) is the following algorithm: applicants are considered in a certain order. Each applicant on her turn chooses the most preferred set of courses among those that are still available. Serial dictatorship or its variants are used in real labour or educational markets, see Example 4.3 of [11] or [7] .
It is easy to see that the following assertion is true.
Proposition 2 Each matching obtained by SD is Pareto optimal.
Abraham et al. [5] showed that in the one-to-one case the converse is also true: each Pareto optimal matching can be obtained by SD in a suitable order. We show that in the many-to-many case the situation changes.
Example 3 Let us now consider the instance of the price-budget cap given in Table 2 . In this instance, at least four applicants are matched in each Pareto optimal matching M . First, note that q(c 2 ) = 2, while only a 1 and a 4 apply to c 2 and both have enough budget, so both are assigned to it and M (a 4 ) = {c 2 }. Further, exactly one of a 2 , a 3 is assigned to c 3 , otherwise the trade-in-free property is violated. Hence, to achieve a POM with only three matched applicants, there are only two possibilities. It is easy to see that in both cases pair (a 5 , c 1 ) violates the trade-in-free property (case 1: a 2 and a 5 unassigned; case 2: a 3 and a 5 unassigned). Further, it is easy to construct orders of proposals, producing Pareto optimal matchings with four and five matched applicants; see Table 3 for examples of such Table 3 : POMs with four and five matched applicants and the orders in SD to obtain them
POMs together with the orders in which the SD mechanism considers the choices of each applicant. Now we show that in this example, not all Pareto optimal matchings can be obtained by serial dictatorship in the many-to-many case. Consider the matching M given by
It is easy to see that M is a POM. Suppose that M was obtained by SD. Then, since only applicants a 1 and a 4 are assigned to their first choices, one of them must have been the first one to make the choice.
Suppose that a 1 was the first. Then neither of the applicants a 2 , a 3 and a 5 could be in the second position, since they would have chosen {c 3 , c 4 }, {c 3 } and {c 1 } respectively, as these are their first choices and they were still available after the move of a 1 . Hence the second one to make the choice was a 4 . After the choice of a 4 , courses c 3 and c 4 are still available, and since they are among the first choices of a 3 and a 2 , it can be the turn for neither of them. So the third one to choose must be a 5 . But c 1 , the first choice for a 5 , is still available, so neither applicant a 5 can be in the third position.
Suppose that a 4 was the first one to make the choice. Again, a 1 must follow immediately and we arrive at exactly the same situation as before, when no player could make her choice as the third one.
Consider the following mechanism, called here Generalized Serial Dictatorship (GSD). Initially, all courses are closed and all applicants are labelled as active. At each round, let S(a) denote the set of courses already assigned to applicant a and A ⊆ A be the subset of active applicants. Each GSD round amounts to arbitrarily selecting an applicant a ∈ A who receives her most preferable course c that is undersubscribed and satisfies S(a) ∪ {c} ∈ F a . If no such course exists, a is removed from A . The GSD terminates once A = ∅.
Intuitively, the GSD is a sequence a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a r of applicants, in which repetitions may occur, such that applicant a i selects a single course c i .
Lemma 1
The output of a GSD is a POM.
Proof. The output of a GSD is a matching M, since quotas of courses and feasibility sets of applicants are checked at each GSD round. By Theorem 1, if M is not a POM, it is not maximal or not trade-in-free or not coalition-free. If M is not maximal, there is a course c that is undersubscribed and an applicant a such that M (a) ∪ {c} ∈ F a . Then, applicant a is active in GSD terms, a contradiction to the fact that GSD has terminated. If M is not trade-in-free, there is an undersubscribed course c and an applicant a such that (M (a) ∪ {c}) \D M (a, c) ∈ F a ; but then, applicant a prefers c to any c ∈ D M (a, c), a contradiction to the rule that at each GSD round an applicant selects her most preferable course that has an empty slot. If there is a coalition K = ((a 0 , c 0 ) , . . . , (a r−1 , c r−1 )) in M, let a i , i ∈ {0, . . . , r− 1} be the applicant at the earliest among the GSD rounds in which the pairs in K were matched. This implies that a i selected c i instead of the more preferred c i+1 , which, by definition of a i was selected by a i+1 at a subsequent round ; the only reason for that to occur would be that c i+1 had no empty slot, which in turns contradicts that c i+1 was available for a i+1 at a subsequent round.
The converse is also true.
Theorem 3 Any POM is obtainable by the GSD in a suitable order.
Proof. If M is a POM, then G(M ) is acyclic by Theorem 2 thus admitting a topological ordering τ . Let us denote by (a 1 , c 1 ), (a 2 , c 2 ), . . . , (a |M | , c |M | ) the pairs matched in M ordered according to the inverse of τ restricted to matching vertices. For brevity, let us denote by GSD(τ ) the realization of GSD with the order of applicants a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a |M | . We show that GSD(τ ) outputs exactly M , i.e., in step i, applicant a i will choose exactly c i , for i = 1, 2, . . . , |M |. To get a contradiction, suppose that GSD(τ ) outputs some other POM, denoted by M . Let j be the first step in GSD(τ ), where applicant a j chooses something different from c j . Let us denote by S j (a) the set of courses that applicant a has obtained under GSD(τ ) up to (but not including) step j. Notice that S j (a) ⊆ M (a) for each applicant a ∈ A. Let us consider two cases in turn.
Case 1. Applicant a j did not choose c j because this course was not available in step j. This means |{a ∈ A; c j ∈ S j (a)}| = q(c j ). As a j ∈ M (c j ) too, this implies
. . , c k } and suppose that the courses are written here in the order of decreasing preference of a j and that c j = c . Notice that G(M ) contains the path P joining the vertices a j , a j c k , . . . , a j c , . . . , a j c 1 in this order.
Case 2a. Course c * has a free slot in M . This means that G(M ) contains in addition to the arcs of path P arcs (c * , a j ) and (a j c , c * ), thus a cycle. This is a contradiction to Theorem 2.
Case 2b. Course c * is full in M . This means that there are applicants a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a q(c * ) who are matched to c
. This means that in GSD(τ ) all the applicants a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a q(c * ) had chosen c * before step j and hence c * was not available for a j when making her choice. We arrived at a contradiction again.
Hence to obtain a POM, one can run the GSD with an arbitrary order of applicants. After an applicant has made her choice, she will either leave the market (if she cannot choose any available course to remain feasible) or enter the queue again. Let us suppose that each applicant can make her choice in constant time. Then, if a POM M is obtained, the number of rounds will be O(|M |). In general, the computational complexity of GSD can be bounded by O(|A| · |C|), or more precisely, by O(L), where L is the number of acceptable pairs.
Minimum and maximum Pareto optimal matchings
Let us denote by min-pom and max-pom the problems to decide, given an instance I of the many-to-many Pareto optimal matching problem and an integer k, whether I admits a Pareto optimal matching M of cardinality at most k and at least k, respectively. NP-completeness of the former problem has been proved in Theorem 2 of [5] and in Theorem 6.6. in [9] for the one-to-one case. We give here a slightly stronger result by proving the NP-completeness even for the case when the preference list of each applicant is restricted to contain at most two entries. By contrast, max-pom is polynomially solvable in the one-to-one case and we prove that it is also NP-complete here.
Theorem 4 min-pom is NP-complete even in the one-to-one case and when the preference list of each applicant contains at most two entries.
Proof. By Corollary 1, min-pom belongs to NP. We shall prove the NP-completeness by a polynomial transformation from vertex cover. Let G = (V, E) be a graph and k an integer. We define an instance I of pom as follows. For each vertex v ∈ V we define a vertex course c v and for each edge e ∈ E an edge course c e . Further, for each edge e = {u, v} ∈ E there are two applicants e u and e v with preference lists P (e u ) : c e , c u ;
Let the quota of each course be 1 and the feasible sets of courses of each applicant be singletons. Now we show that G has a vertex cover of size at most k if and only if I admits a Pareto optimal matching M such that |M | ≤ |E| + k.
Let W ⊆ V be a vertex cover of size ≤ k. We construct a matching M of cardinality at most |E| + as follows. For each edge e = {u, v} pick a vertex in W incident to e, say u ∈ W . Assign e v to c e in M and denote the set of these applicants by A 1 . This means that the applicants not assigned so far belong to {e u , e ∈ E; u ∈ W }. These applicants cannot be matched with edge courses (since all courses have quota 1 and are already matched with some applicant in A 1 ) and hence desire only vertex courses associated with vertices in W . Moreover, to each such course we can assign at most one acceptable applicant. Denote these applicants by A 2 . Clearly, |M | ≤ |E| + and it remains to show that M is Pareto optimal. This is easy, as M can be obtained by a serial dictatorship if we first let applicants in A 1 make their choices (in an arbitrary order), then applicants in A 2 (in an arbitrary order) and then the rest of applicants.
Conversely, let M be a POM such that |M | ≤ |E| + k. Clearly, each edge course is full, otherwise M would not be maximal or would not be trade-in-free. Moreover, at most k further applicants are assigned to vertex courses. Let us denote the set of full vertex courses by W . To show that W corresponds to a vertex cover in G, let us suppose that for some edge e = {u, v} both c u and c v are closed. As one of the applicants e u and e v is unassigned, this is a contradiction with maximality of M and this concludes the proof.
The following results is in a sharp contrast with with the polynomial solvability of max-pom in the one-to-one case. Abraham et al. [5] gave an O( |A|L) algorithm that was extended to the one-to-many case (Capacitated House Allocation problem) by Sng [13] , see also [9] , Chapter 6.
Theorem 5 max-pom is NP-complete.
Proof. By Corollary 1, max-pom belongs to NP. To show NP-completeness, we again give a polynomial transformation from vertex cover. Let G = (V, E) be a graph and k be an integer. Denote |V | by n and |E| by m. Define an instance I of pom as follows. For each vertex v ∈ V there is an applicant a v . For each edge e ∈ E there is a course c e with price 1. Moreover, there are n − k special courses z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n−k , each of price n. The quota of each course is 1 and the budget of each applicant is n. The preference list of applicant a v contains first all the special courses ordered z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n−k and then all the courses corresponding to the edges incident to v in any strict order.
We show that G has a vertex cover of size ≤ k if and only if I has a POM with cardinality n + m − k.
Let W = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w }, ≤ k be a vertex cover in G. For each edge e ∈ E take a vertex w ∈ W that is incident with e (if e is covered by two vertices in W , choose the one with the smaller index in W ) and assign in M applicant a w to c e . The number of filled places is so far equal to m. Of the remaining n − ≥ n − k applicants assign exactly n−k of them to special courses arbitrarily, one applicant to each course. As all the courses are full, the size of the obtained matching |M | is n + m − k. To see that M is Pareto optimal it suffices to realize that it can be obtained by serial dictatorship in the order M (z 1 ), M (z 2 ), . . . , M (z n−k ), w 1 , . . . , w and the rest of the applicants in an arbitrary order.
Conversely, let M be any POM in I of size n + m − k. As M is maximal and trade-in-free, all special courses are full. Applicants assigned to them cannot be assigned to any other course because of the budget constraints. This means that the remaining n − (n − k) = k applicants are assigned all the m courses c e , e ∈ E, and so these applicants correspond to a vertex cover of cardinality k.
Notice that the hardness results apply also when one wants to maximize or minimize the number of open courses. The latter might also have an economic interpretation: if each open course bears some fixed cost, minimizing their number means minimizing these costs.
By contrast, a POM that maximizes the number of assigned applicants can be found in polynomial time by the following procedure. First, given a many-to-many instance I derive an associated one-to-one instance J by leaving for each applicant only feasible sets of cardinality one and making as many clones of each course as is its quota. Find a maximum cardinality POM in J by the algorithm described in [5] . We know that in the one-to-one case each POM can be obtained by a serial dictatorship in a suitable order, again [5] provides a polynomial algorithm for finding this order. Then, after merging the clones of individual courses back, continue in the GSD with the used ordering of applicants as the starting point of the GSD. Since the number of assigned applicants will never be decreased, we can find a POM that maximizes the number of assigned applicants.
